

Crescent School Model United Nations 2024



A Background Guide for:

**Disarmament and International
Security Committee**

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Land Acknowledgement

Crescent School and the staff of CSMUN acknowledge that we are gathered upon and would like to honour the traditional territory of many nations including the Mississaugas of the Credit, the Anishnabeg, the Chippewa, the Haudenosaunee, and the Wendat peoples and is now home to many diverse First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples. We thank them for their stewardship of the land and we are in solidarity with our Indigenous Brothers and Sisters as we move forward in reconciliation.

Acknowledging the traditional territories of Indigenous peoples is not only a gesture of respect but also a recognition of the historical and ongoing injustices they face. It is a reminder that the impacts of colonization, displacement, and systemic discrimination continue to reverberate today. We would like to take the opportunity to honour the resilience of Indigenous communities and commit to amplifying their voices in our pursuit of justice and equity.

Equity Disclaimers

In the event that you have concerns about equity, diversity, inclusion, or belonging or are uncomfortable due to the actions of another delegate, chair, co-chair, or staff member of CSMUN II, please reach out to the Equity Team to file your concern. Equity is outlined through the code of conduct listed above. You may reach out through an anonymous form to the equity team, by speaking to your chairs, or by emailing any member of the CSMUN II Secretariat if you feel comfortable. The Equity team can be reached at csmunequity@crescentschool.org

The Equity Form is here to submit any equity concerns (Equity Form). This can be found also in committee rooms.

Equity concerns are taken very seriously at CSMUN II. The equity policy of CSMUN II is strict in accordance with the school's Diversity Statement, and the Crescent School Constitution which includes the Crescent School Declaration of Student Rights, and violations outside of reason will not be tolerated. The School's Constitution was prepared in accordance with, and in support of, the Safe Schools Act and corresponding principles in the Education Act, as well as the Human Rights Code. When an equity is filled, the CSMUN II Equity team will step in and take appropriate steps and actions to remedy the situation. CSMUN II is committed to ensuring that everyone is valued with respect, responsibility, honesty, and compassion. We are committed to pursuing disciplinary action as stated above if needed to facilitate a positive, and safe environment.

Tech Policy

Please note that some form of Smart Device is required to participate in the CSMUN. While we are a paper conference (with the exception of crisis committees), delegates will need to use their computers to write and work during the unmods. Communications with delegates, the dias or other staff can be done either via paper notes, or email.

Delegates at CSMUN II are expected to utilize technology responsibly and ethically throughout the conference. While the use of smart devices, computers, and digital tools is necessary for research, writing, and collaboration, delegates are prohibited from utilizing artificial intelligence (AI) systems or automated tools to gain an unfair advantage or manipulate conference proceedings. Pre-writing resolutions outside of unmods and using AI to write resolutions and working papers is also prohibited. Delegates must also refrain from engaging in any illegal activities, including but not limited to hacking, piracy, or distribution of harmful content to anyone in or outside of the conference.

The Prohibition Crisis Committee will be run as a paperless committee. Slack will be used as the main means of communication between delegates, dias, and backroom staff. Staff are also available by email. If you have any questions about the tech policy and tech logistics of the Prohibition CC please feel free to reach out to the chair or director at either jacksonding2025@crescentschool.org

Letter from the Secretary-General

A Letter from the Secretary General of CSMUN II

Dear Delegates & Faculty Advisors,

It is our great pleasure to welcome you to the Crescent School Model United Nations Conference, also known as CSMUN II. This is Iliyan Gangani and William He, and we are honoured to be your Secretaries Generals along with Deputy Secretary General Simon Rabinovitch to present to you a rewarding conference experience. With years of MUN experience, we are excited to lead the organizing team in your service. In our 21st year as a Model UN community, we are excited to enter our third decade with you by hosting an engaging conference. We look forward to a spirited conference with delegates showing character, learning about global affairs, debate, politics & diplomacy providing a fun experience and meeting new people from across the GTA.

As the organizing team behind CSMUN II, we look forward to running 7 engaging committee simulations continuing our success from CSMUN I. The conference is taking place on December 7th, and December 8th, 2024 at Crescent School in Toronto. This conference aims to provide delegates with the opportunity to delve into various world issues and collaborate on finding solutions. Our goal is to amplify diverse voices and foster meaningful dialogue on pressing global challenges.

We also look forward to providing an existing delegate experience with our delegate networking event on December 7th, as well as an exciting opening ceremony. As a conference for all levels of experience, we challenge you to be creative, and open-minded and explore to the fullest extent of what MUN has to offer. If you have any questions or require assistance for registering and receiving assignments please feel free to reach out to our team at modelun@crescentschool.org. We are so excited to welcome you to CSMUN II for what promises to be an unforgettable conference. See you in December!

Best,

William He & Iliyan Gangani | Secretary Generals

Simon Rabinovitch | Deputy Secretary-General

Crescent School Model United Nations 2024

A letter from Dais

A Letter from the Chair

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the Disarmament & International Security Committee! Thank you for choosing to be a part of the best committee in CSMUN II. My name is Jackson Ding, and I am extremely excited to be your director this year!

I am a grade 12 student at Crescent School. I have been participating in MUN since I was in grade 10. Competing in various conferences worldwide, MUN has become one of my favourite activities outside of school. The best thing about MUN for me is the ability to connect with all types of people. I met some of my favourite people through MUN. So, use this as an opportunity to connect with your fellow delegates. Conferences can also be like roller coasters; you have times when people laugh together, and then you have times when there's not enough space for the Author's panel. However, the most important part of this committee is enjoying the experience.

DISEC is arguably the most influential General Assembly within the United Nations. This was the committee I was in for my first-ever Harvard MUN conference, which had over 400 delegates. DISEC is often seen as a beginner committee, but it deals with heavy issues and can require critical thinking for more creative solutions.

In terms of preparation, this background guide will give you broad resources, but in no way **should not be the main source of your information**. I encourage all delegates to research your country's stances and conduct your research.

Lastly, I want everyone to gain something more than just an experience or an award from this committee to put down on a resume. I want the delegates in DISEC to feel the passion and joy of delegating, communicating, and collaborating with others. The best way to do that would be to raise that placard for speeches or try to have an opinion during unmods. Don't be afraid to fail, and try to be creative and think of some new solutions to these long-standing issues. Feel free to contact me if you have any questions at jacksonding2025@crescentschool.org.

Best of luck,
Jackson Ding | Chair of CSMUN II: DISEC

A Letter from the Co-Chair

Dear delegates,

Neither Guns nor butter are perfect choices for a country to produce but hey, that's how the real world works sometimes, particularly in MUN. It's not about perfection but how you use the resources you're given. My name is Yuki and I'm a grade 11 student at the Bishop Strachan School. This is my 3rd year doing MUN and I'm excited to be the Co-chair of the DISEC Committee working alongside Jackson and Thomas. I've won at Princeton MUN, SSUNS, and UTMUN and out of all the conferences I've been to, DISEC is a committee I hold close to my heart and probably one of my favourites to participate in and watch.

This committee discusses some of the most pressing issues humanity faces in terms of sustainability and human rights. What makes this committee particularly exciting is countries differing views on actions (or lack of), policies and interventions. However, what ultimately unites us all is the goal of protecting our communities and the betterment of humanity. While arguments, debates and conflicts may arise (or if you are all extremely cooperative you might not) it's important to remember the underlying goals of global peace and security.

Regardless of how nervous or excited you might be, I hope you all learn and most importantly have fun. I hope that in this committee we can put aside our competitive drive and not be afraid to fumble in our speeches or be okay with taking a step back to let others share their ideas.

I hope all of you enjoy this committee as I did before and I can't wait to meet you all in December!

Best of luck,

Yuki Wen | Co-Chair of CSMUN II: DISEC

Part 1

Introduction to the Problem

The Militarization of Space

The militarization of space has become a pressing concern in recent years, as major powers like the United States, China, and Russia have increasingly weaponized and turned space into a domain to prove political and economic power. This space transformation into a military and political domain poses significant threats and risks to global security. According to the Defense Space Strategy, space is recognized as a unique domain of national military power, and its militarization is aimed at ensuring space superiority to secure vital national interests. Major players in the space industry, both government-run space agencies and private companies, compete not only for prestige but also for strategic advantages, economic benefits, and potential resources. The militarization of space goes beyond economic opportunities and competition. Space assets, such as satellites, have become critical for military capabilities, including surveillance, communication, and navigation, making them vulnerable targets in conflict. Anti-satellite tests and the creation of space debris have raised concerns about the weaponization of space and the potentially destabilizing effects of such actions. In addition, efforts to address the militarization of space and prevent the weaponization of outer space have encountered challenges. The distinction between militarization and weaponization has failed, as the normalization of militarization has encouraged weaponization and other harmful activities. The lack of clear international regulations governing space activities and the ambiguity surrounding lunar resource rights have further fueled tensions. To prevent further escalation, there is a need for international cooperation, transparency, and the development of norms and agreements to govern behaviour in space. Efforts should focus on preventing an arms race in outer space, promoting responsible behaviour, and pursuing unilateral arms control measures to de-escalate militarization and arms racing.

The Ongoing Threat of Chemical Warfare

Chemical Warfare is the use of toxic chemical substances to inflict casualties or incapacitate enemy forces. These substances can be delivered through various means, including bombs, artillery shells, and aerial sprays. The effects of chemical weapons can range from immediate death to long-term health problems. The history of chemical warfare dates back to ancient times when poisonous substances were used in warfare. However, the modern era of chemical warfare began during World War I, when chlorine gas was first used on the battlefield. Since then, chemical weapons have been used in numerous conflicts around the world, including the Iran-Iraq War and the Syrian Civil War. Given history, the use of chemical weapons is widely condemned by the international community. Several international treaties, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, have been signed to prohibit the development, production, and use of these weapons. Despite these efforts, the threat of chemical warfare remains a concern for human rights protection.

Part 2

Topic A: The Militarization of Space

Current Situation:

The militarization of space has rapidly evolved as countries increasingly view space as the next frontier for national security and defence. Nations like the United States, China, and Russia heavily invest in space-based military technologies, such as satellite defence systems, missile detection networks, and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. This trend poses significant geopolitical and security challenges as space becomes more integrated into modern warfare and intelligence.

One of the most notable developments is the creation of space-focused military branches, such as the United States Space Force, which was established in 2019 to protect American interests in space. Other nations, including China and Russia, have similarly expanded their space capabilities, raising concerns about a potential arms race. Both nations have developed and tested ASAT weapons, which can destroy or disable satellites, a crucial component of global communication, surveillance, and missile detection.

At the same time, private space companies, such as SpaceX and Blue Origin, are playing an increasing role in space activities, complicating the regulatory landscape. Their growing influence has created new opportunities for space exploration but also introduces challenges in preventing the weaponization of space.

International treaties, like the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, prohibit the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space and limit military activities on celestial bodies. However, these treaties contain loopholes and are often outdated, failing to address modern technologies and the new realities of space militarization. Efforts to establish more robust international regulations, such as the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), have seen limited progress due to differing national interests.

Legal Issues

The legal concerns surrounding the militarization of space stem from the outdated and insufficient frameworks established by current treaties. The 1967 **Outer Space Treaty** (OST) prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space but fails to address the development of other military technologies, such as anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, or the broader militarization of space. This leaves significant gaps, as modern technological advancements in space are increasingly dual-use, meaning they can serve civilian and military purposes.

Efforts to strengthen space law have encountered numerous obstacles. One key initiative has been the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), a UN resolution

advocating for a ban on space-based weapons. Despite near-unanimous support from the international community, the PAROS resolution has failed to gain traction, primarily due to opposition from nations like the United States, which seeks flexibility in developing future space-based defense capabilities.

Moreover, recent diplomatic efforts, such as Russia and China's Proposed Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT), have been met with resistance, particularly from the U.S., which argues that these treaties do not adequately address ground-based threats to space assets. While some voluntary measures, such as transparency and confidence-building initiatives, have been developed, they lack legal enforceability and have seen limited implementation.

Case Study I: The Role of Satellites in Modern Warfare

Satellites have completely changed contemporary military operations since the 1957 launch of Sputnik 1, acting as vital instruments for communication, navigation intelligence collection, and surveillance. For military forces worldwide, these space-based resources are invaluable because they offer precise targeting, real-time coordination, and battlefield tracking. It has illustrated the vital role that satellites play in contemporary warfare in the Gulf War of 1991, which is also sometimes referred to as the first space war. Global Positioning Systems (GPS) changed how large-scale military operations occurred during the war by enabling forces to conduct extremely accurate airstrikes and ground maneuvers. Operational efficiency was greatly enhanced by real-time decision-making and coordination between troops and command centers made possible by satellite communication. Since then, the satellite's strategic advantage has grown.

Satellites have been widely utilized in recent wars like the Iraq War for tactical planning, missile guidance, and reconnaissance. Commanders can monitor enemy movements, evaluate the effectiveness of airstrikes, and make real-time strategy adjustments thanks to satellite imagery, which gives them an aerial view of the battlefield. In missile defense systems, satellites are also essential because they can detect the impending launch of ballistic missiles early on. For example, the US Space-based sensors have enabled missile defense programs to identify and track possible threats before they reach their targets, enabling prompt responses.

Even with the benefits, there are serious worries about satellite vulnerability as their use grows. Anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons can cause satellites to malfunction or even demolish themselves. One of China's weather satellites was destroyed in a successful ASAT test carried out in 2007. This incident showed that although satellites are essential to contemporary warfare, they are also prime targets and signaled a dramatic increase in the militarization of space. There are worries about the future of space security due to the

growing development of ASAT capabilities by several countries such as China, Russia, and the United States. With more nations investing in ASAT technologies, there is always a chance that space-based infrastructure will be compromised during hostilities. Because of our dependence on satellites and their vulnerabilities, safeguarding space assets is becoming increasingly important to maintaining international security.

Case Study II: The Development of Space-Based Weapons

The Outer Space Treaty forbids the stationing of nuclear weapons or other WMDs in orbit or on celestial bodies, but it ignores the development of conventional weapons in space, which creates a serious gap. There are now worries about an upcoming space arms race because of this loophole, which has allowed multiple countries—including China, Russia, and the United States—to investigate the development of space-based weapons.

Distant enemy satellites or missiles can be rendered inoperable by space-based lasers known as Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs), one of the most concerning technological advancements. With the ability to neutralize threats without using conventional explosives to minimize collateral damage and enable quick, focused strikes, these weapons provide a substantial strategic advantage. The US Space Force, founded in 2019, has prioritized research on DEWs because of their potential to change the nature of warfare. Kinetic Energy Weapons (KEWs) are another developing technology that entails firing projectiles from space to destroy targets on Earth or in orbit. These weapons offer a novel form of warfare that is challenging to counter by utilizing their kinetic energy rather than explosives to cause destruction.

Developments that could lead to quick covert space attacks on Earth, such as orbital bombardment systems, are also worrisome. These systems pose a serious threat to national security because they can get past established defenses. Due to a lack of comprehensive international regulations governing the development of such weapons, nations can pursue military technologies in space with minimal checks and balances. Global security is in danger of becoming unstable due to the militarization of space and the development of space-based weaponry. Geopolitical tensions have impeded efforts to prevent an arms race in space.

Guiding Questions:

1. What are your country's current capabilities within outer space? How do they compare to other countries?
2. What is your country's stance on the militarization of outer space? How do they view other countries designing weapons like ASATs? Does your country wish to improve its own space program?
3. What are the key limitations of current international treaties governing space, and how does your country view these gaps?
4. How can space be used for peaceful purposes, such as disaster response, global communication, and climate monitoring, without escalating military tensions?
5. How is your country affected by the development of space-based weapons? Think about environmental concerns and technology transfer for less developed nations.

Part 3

Topic B: The Ongoing Threat of Chemical Warfare

Current Situation

Chemical warfare involves the use of toxic chemical substances as weapons to inflict harm or death on humans, animals, or plants. Throughout history, chemical weapons have been used to devastating effect, with some of the earliest modern examples occurring during World War I. The use of mustard gas, chlorine, and other chemical agents led to horrific casualties, prompting international efforts to ban their use.

Despite these efforts, chemical weapons have continued to be a serious threat. Various types of chemical agents are classified based on their effects. Nerve agents like sarin and VX are among the most lethal, attacking the nervous system and causing death by suffocation. Blister agents, such as mustard gas, cause severe skin, eye, and respiratory irritation. Blood agents (e.g., cyanide) disrupt the body's ability to use oxygen, while choking agents, like chlorine, affect the respiratory system.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 was the first significant international agreement to ban the use of chemical weapons, though it did not prevent countries from stockpiling them. In 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) strengthened these efforts by prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, and use of chemical weapons. However, enforcement remains challenging, with countries like Syria accused of using chemical weapons despite being signatories.

Non-state actors, including terrorist organizations, also pose a growing threat. Chemical weapons are relatively easy to produce and deploy, making them attractive for groups looking to cause mass casualties. In response, international organizations such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) work to ensure compliance and to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons globally.

Technological Advancement

Despite international agreements like the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the destruction of declared chemical stockpiles, technological advancements pose new challenges in preventing the resurgence of chemical warfare. Recent innovations have made chemical weapons more sophisticated, with developments in the synthesis, production, and delivery systems of these agents.

One of the most concerning trends is the rise of fourth-generation chemical agents, such as Novichok, a nerve agent that was used in the 2018 assassination attempt on Russian ex-spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter in the UK. Novichok is especially dangerous because it is harder to detect and neutralize compared to older nerve agents, demonstrating how new technologies are making these weapons deadlier and more difficult to counter.

Another worrying advancement is the proliferation of pharmaceutical-based agents, which are easier to produce and conceal from intelligence efforts. Fentanyl, for instance, a powerful synthetic opioid, has been suggested as a potential chemical weapon due to its potency and the ease with which it can be weaponized for large-scale attacks.

In response to these growing threats, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has established new research centers like the Centre for Chemistry and Technology (CCT). These facilities aim to enhance the detection, research, and training capabilities needed to counter chemical warfare's evolving nature.

Case Study I: Chemical Weapons in the Iran-Iraq War

After World War I, the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) is still regarded as one of the most prominent instances of the widespread use of chemical weapons. To break the impasse with Iranian forces, Iraqi forces under Saddam Hussein's regime extensively used chemical agents such as sarin and mustard gas during the conflict. In addition to being used against Iranian forces, these weapons were also used to attack civilian targets, mainly in Kurdish regions such as Halabja. In 1988, Iraqi forces used a mixture of sarin and mustard gas in Halabja, possibly one of the most notorious chemical attacks of the war, killing thousands of civilians who were Kurdish.

The blistering agent mustard gas causes severe harm to the eyes, skin, and respiratory system, leaving survivors with permanent wounds and scars. Potent nerve agent sarin acts much more quickly, producing paralysis convulsions and eventually death by suffocation within minutes of exposure. Because Iranian forces were unprepared for the scope and ferocity of chemical warfare, these attacks had a devastating psychological and physical impact. The employment of chemical weapons significantly changed the balance of

power on the battlefield, and Iranian troops suffered significant casualties due to a lack of protective gear. Due in large part to Iraq's strategic significance in the region, the international response to Iraq's use of chemical weapons was muted.

The use of chemical weapons was prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol; however, due to lax enforcement mechanisms and geopolitical concerns, many countries, especially in the West, were reluctant to intervene or impose sanctions. Saddam Hussein's regime was widely condemned, but its actions had little immediate repercussion. The absence of global responsibility emphasized the shortcomings of current arms control accords and emphasized the requirement for stronger enforcement protocols.

The international community finally responded to the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which sought to forbid the use of chemical weapons in the future by establishing a thorough legal framework for their prohibition, was largely influenced by the horrors carried out during the conflict. The conflict still serves as a stark reminder of the terrible effects that chemical weapons can have on both military personnel and civilians, as well as the limitations of international agreements that are superseded by political considerations.

Case Study II: The Syrian Civil War and Chemical Weapons

Since the Syrian Civil War began in 2011, it has seen significant use of chemical weapons, particularly by the Assad regime. In one of the most well-known events, Sarin gas killed over 1000 people in Ghouta in August 2013; many of them were women and children. Following the attack, there was a significant international outcry, which prompted the US and Russia to launch diplomatic efforts to destroy Syria's chemical weapons stockpile. In response to international pressure, Syria acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It granted the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) supervision over the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile.

These diplomatic initiatives haven't stopped Syria from using chemical weapons, however. Chlorine gas has been the most often utilized chemical agent in subsequent attacks, particularly in civilian areas. The CWC does not classify chlorine as a chemical weapon when used in industrial settings, but using it as a weapon is still forbidden. OPCW and UN investigations have found that the Syrian government is responsible for multiple chemical attacks that have disproportionately affected civilians. By using chemical weapons against opposition strongholds, the Assad regime seeks to undermine resistance and demoralize civilian populations.

The international response to Syria's continued use of chemical weapons has become more challenging due to geopolitical factors. Russia, a key ally of the Assad regime,

has continuously thwarted efforts by the UN Security Council to hold Syria accountable for its actions. Russia has used its veto power to thwart resolutions that would have authorized military action against the Syrian government or imposed sanctions. This has seriously limited the ability of the international community to enforce the CWC and punish violations.

The lack of strong enforcement measures has allowed the Assad regime to continue its chemical attacks substantially unhindered despite the OPCW's significant progress in identifying and verifying the use of chemical weapons in Syria. The Syrian Civil War highlights the challenges of maintaining international arms control agreements in the face of geopolitical issues and the limitations of diplomacy in preventing the use of chemical weapons in modern conflicts.

Guiding Questions:

1. What is your country's stance on the development, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons?
2. What measures has your country taken to prevent chemical weapons from being used by state or non-state actors?
3. What should be done to address the use of chemical weapons by non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations?
4. How can international treaties, such as the Geneva Protocol of 1925 or the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), be strengthened to better address current challenges in chemical warfare?
5. What role should the international community play in responding to nations accused of using chemical weapons in conflict zones, as seen in countries like Syria?

Part 4

Committee Structure

The Disarmament and International Security Committee, more commonly known as DISEC, is the first committee within the United Nations General Assembly. DISEC was established in 1945, a momentous period when the world grappled with the complexities of disarmament and global security. It channels its efforts toward arms control, conflict resolution, and the preservation of international stability. Amid the charged atmosphere of international relations, the committee shoulders the weighty responsibility of shaping discourse on disarmament while navigating the intricate interplay of nations in their pursuit of security.

Like most General Assemblies, DISEC is a committee that operates on resolutions. The majority of delegates ought to have a solid understanding of the position their nation takes on the issue as well as the potential resolutions that are discussed during committee meetings. It is up to you to balance the position taken by your country and the interests it pursues while simultaneously pursuing a diplomatic resolution to the issue at hand. **Although this committee will be tackling two different topics, it is worth noting that they can both be considered under the wide umbrella of the encroaching threat of militarization.**

Part 5

Position Papers

For the CSMUN II: DISEC, position papers are **mandatory**. Submitting a position paper would give the dais a better outlook on your country's motivations for their actions in committee, it will **be required** to be eligible for awards. If you decide to write a position paper for this committee, do not exceed 1 page in length with 1-inch margins. This way, I can get a glimpse at your country, the research you have conducted, and the type of delegate you will be in the debate. To learn more about position paper writing, formatting, and submission, please check out the position paper guidelines. We strongly encourage delegates to read through the guidelines carefully as this page will describe content recommendations, formatting requirements, and details on citations. If you have any questions about position paper writing, feel free to contact the dais through jacksonding@crescentschool.org, or the secretariat at modelun@crescentschool.org.

Part 6

Closing Remarks

Whether it is ASATs or synthetic opioids used in warfare, these problems have been brought to the UN's attention for decades. However, the UN never seems to create solutions that completely resolve these issues, partially due to larger countries vetoing decisions. The beauty of Model United Nations is that you guys get to think of more creative solutions to tackle these problems. Therefore, I encourage you to reflect not only on current conflicts but also on new solutions that aren't just creating new committees, creating new funds, or starting a new task force.

If you've made it this far into the background guide, I must commend you because I can say with certainty that most delegates will probably not make that effort. Even so, I hope that delegates take away something from this conference, whether that be a newfound perspective on an age-old conflict or a new friend found in what is essentially an elaborate game of D&D. Whatever you take away from CSMUN, I hope that it impacts your life for the better. Feel free to reach out to me if you have any questions or concerns at jacksonding2025@crescentschool.org

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